[Leading up to the credit crisis, financial models took a] view of the world that was far more benign than it was reasonable to take, emphasizing recent inputs over more historic numbers. -Myron Scholes, quoted in "Efficiency and Beyond," The Economist,
Even the tamest financial markets can produce unpredictably wild return dynamics. Low volatility regimes are punctuated with extreme events, and interspersed with bursts of turbulence that differ in magnitude, duration, and other details. 1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 Figure 1 Daily returns to the MSCI USA Index; highlighted time-span is four years prior to the credit crisis (June 2003 -May 2007 . Even a comparatively tame index can produce wild return dynamics. This may not be evident over time intervals that are typically used to forecast volatility at horizons up to three months. 1981 -1983 1984 -1987 1988 -1991 1992 -1995 1996 -1999 2000 -2003 2008 -July 2009 Figure 2 Contemporaneous daily returns to Coca-Cola (horizontal axis) and Exxon-Mobil (vertical axis) in fouryear snapshots (January 1981 -December 2007 and a shorter final snapshot (January 2008 -July 2009 . Stocks that appear to be uncorrelated in one time period can appear to be correlated in another.
history. One reason is that the cornerstone of risk management, volatility (or equivalently, its square, variance), shows uncommon predictability across consecutive periods of up to three months. Figure 3 shows realized volatility on adjacent periods of one week, one month, and three months over the history of the MSCI USA Index, which begins in 1972. The straight-line relationship implies that tomorrow's volatility is largely an echo of today's. Figure 3 illustrates the well-known point that recent history may be the best guide to forecasting volatility, and indeed volatility over horizons up to three months is most commonly measured using a relatively short history. For daily volatility, a common choice is to exponentially weight the history with a half-life of approximately 23 days. This means that data from the past six months almost completely determine tomorrow's forecast, so daily volatility is not ideally suited to take full advantage of a deep history.
This paper focuses on shortfall, which is an extreme risk measure that harnesses market history while retaining volatility's intuitive, predictable, and useful properties. The concept of shortfall is not new. However, practical advances that enable investors to take account of shortfall in portfolio construction and risk analysis are of recent vintage. The long view of history that is required to accurately estimate shortfall implies that it has the potential to carry information that complements volatility. As a result, shortfall can be a meaningful adjunct to volatility in the investment process.
However, shortfall is not the only possible volatility supplement. Different aspects of a portfolio return distribution can be probed with convex risk measures, which can be analyzed with standard risk management tools such as beta and correlation. In Section 1, we discuss convexity, which is the mathematical embodiment of diversification. Both volatility and shortfall are convex risk measures, and in Section 2 we argue that convexity is essential to sound risk management. This argument is controversial, since value at risk is not a convex measure. Subsequently, in Section 3, we describe an empirically based methodology that uses a long view of history to forecast shortfall over horizons of one to ten days. We conclude with three empirical questions concerning leverage, the premium associated with extreme risk, and the fair value of insurance. Answers to these questions would improve our understanding of financial risk and our ability to manage it.
What makes a good risk measure?
In a landmark paper, Markowitz (1952) Eberlein and Madan (2007) and Cherny and Madan (2006) .
Convexity can be visualized in terms of a curve that represents portfolio risk as a function of asset weight. If the risk measure is convex, a straight line between any two points on the curve will lie on or above the curve. Convexity is guaranteed (in one dimension) by a non-decreasing slope (or first derivative), when it exists. This means that as the weight in a risky position increases (and the weight in cash decreases), the slope of portfolio risk also increases or stays flat, but cannot decrease. Some convex and non-convex curves are sketched in Figure 4 . The top left-hand curve in Figure 4 depicts the shape of portfolio variance as a function of weight in a single asset. The only parameter is the ratio of height to width of the curve. Figure 4 illustrates the connection between convexity and diversification: the risk of any combination of two assets (intermediate points) can never be greater than their average stand-alone risks (straight line). Artzner et al. (1999) If a diversified portfolio had greater risk than the average stand-alone risks, this would imply that diversification was intrinsically risky. Convexity allows the diversified risk to equal the average standalone risks, but not exceed it. Non-convexity admits the possibility that the act of putting two assets together in a portfolio entails its own risk, so nonconvex risk measures may encourage concentration over diversification.
More generally, consider a decomposition of a portfolio return into weighted return of n positions, which can be assets, factors, or sectors 3 :
Here x i denotes the weight of position i, and A i denotes its return. A measure µ of the risk of P is convex if
whenever i x i = 1 and x i ≥ 0. 
Managing convex risk
Quantitative risk management relies on a constellation of analysis tools that can uncover unintended bets on common risk factors, illuminate underlying sources of risk, and reveal subtle opportunities for diversification. The standard toolkit includes betas, risk budgets, and correlations, and these tools are usually applied to analyze portfolio volatility σ.
However, a broader analysis stems from the observation that these tools can be expressed in terms of the slope of a position's risk profile (Figure 4 ), also known as the marginal contribution to risk (MCR):
We illustrate the connection between the MCR and the standard toolkit with the beta of a position with respect to a portfolio. A few lines of algebra transform the familiar definition of beta (in terms of covariance and variance) into a portfolio risk-rescaled marginal contribution:
Similarly, the familiar definition of linear correlation between a portfolio and a position (in terms of covariance and standard deviation) can be recast as a marginal contribution rescaled by position risk 5 :
Equation (5) indicates that the marginal contribution of a position to volatility is the product of the position risk and the correlation between the position and the portfolio. This leads to the concept of risk-implied correlation:
which is explored in Cherny and Madan (2007) and Goldberg et al. (2009) . Convex risk-implied correlation is non-decreasing in position weight. Note, however, that this need not hold for a non-convex risk measure. Generalizations of Eqs. (4) and (5) to a convex measure of extreme risk are explored by Goldberg et al. (2009) , who show that a parallel decomposition of two risk measures provides insights that cannot be attained by analyzing a single measure of risk.
Since it is the slope of a risk profile (Eq. (3)), the MCR describes the impact of a sufficiently small trade on portfolio risk. Therefore, by examining marginal contributions across a collection of positions, an investor can determine the set of trades that have the greatest impact on portfolio risk. 6 The gradient (or multidimensional slope) of a risk measure is a vector of MCRs. If the risk measure is convex, the gradient has special utility to investors seeking to optimize against risk since it always leads to a global minimum risk portfolio. In contrast, a non-convex measure may have multiple minima, so a particular minimum risk portfolio is not guaranteed to be the global minimum. Consequently, following the gradient of a nonconvex risk measure may lead away from the global minimum.
Consider an unconstrained portfolio that is meanrisk optimal, so that the position weights x maximize an objective function:
which is expressed in terms of a risk aversion parameter . Since the derivative of the objective f evaluated at the optimal weights is zero:
the expected return of any position is proportional to its MCR:
Running the logic of optimization backwards leads to reverse optimization (see, for example, Sharpe, 2001 or Pearson, 2002 . Assuming a portfolio is optimal, Eq. (9) determines the ratios of expected excess returns to positions in terms of MCR. A manager who is concerned about particular measure of risk (e.g., volatility or extreme risk) 7 can compare risk-implied expected excess returns with his own fundamental views. If there is disagreement, he can rebalance accordingly. Since the slope of a convex risk profile is non-decreasing in the weight of an asset, selling the asset decreases its MCR and buying the asset increases its MCR. For a non-convex measure, this basic investment intuition may be violated: selling an asset can increase its MCR, and hence its implied excess expected return.
The marginal contribution of a position to a convex risk measure is bounded by the stand-alone risk of the position. It may be useful to explicitly consider these bounds, as they define the bounds on expected return in any portfolio through reverse optimization.
The special case of shortfall
Shortfall (s) is the average loss beyond a given (high) percentile of possible losses, so it is an estimate of the expected value of an especially severe loss. The level of severity is specified by the percentile. Shortfall is also known as expected shortfall, conditional value at risk, average value at risk, and expected tail loss. As an average over worst outcomes, shortfall is a guide to capital reserve allocation and risk monitoring. Shortfall provides a forecast of those extreme losses that capital reserves are designed to cover.
Since it is a convex measure of risk, shortfall, like volatility, promotes diversification and is a sensible optimization constraint. Unlike volatility, which is most accurately estimated using recent history, high percentiles of shortfall demand abundant data to obtain reasonable estimation error (see Yamai and Yoshiba, 2002) . Generating adequate relevant data is the most serious challenge to accurately estimating shortfall. Goldberg et al. (2008) develop a model that uses returns to risk factor and time series analysis to generate rich data sets that reflect the risk characteristics of a wide class of portfolios. 8 For example, consider a portfolio P whose exposures to a set of risk factors is given by the vector X. Then a history of common factor return P f to the portfolio is given by:
f t is the vector of time t returns to the factors. The model developed in Goldberg et al. (2008) is implemented in Barra Extreme Risk (BxR), which forecasts and analyzes shortfall at horizons of one to ten days. Goldberg et al. (2008) develop test statistics to assess the accuracy of shortfall forecasts. 9 Based on outof-sample tests over the 11-year period 1996-2007, Goldberg et al. (2008) show that BxR is more accurate than a conditionally normal model, which takes shortfall to be a fixed multiple of volatility. This suggests that a relatively long, consistently applied history provides a more accurate forecast of extreme risk over a one-to ten-day horizon than a short history.
Forecasts of shortfall in BxR are called Extreme Shortfall or xShortfall, and they can be written as a time-dependent volatility term multiplied by a time-independent constant (s t = σ t C ). Estimates of time-independent constant C change as new information becomes available, but are stable when estimated with a long history. A measure NN of non-normality is the ratio of C to the corresponding constant in a Gaussian model (C G ) minus one:
The quantity NN is the fractional difference between xShortfall and a Gaussian shortfall estimate. Figure 5 shows values of NN for style factors in two Barra factor models: Global Equity Model (GEM2) and Europe Equity Model (EUE3). The values were computed on 30 December 2008 using 12 years (GEM2) and 14 years (EUE3) of daily factor history. Protective factors such as Size in both models, and Value in GEM2 appear less risky than normal, while aggressive factors such as Leverage, Growth, and Momentum appear riskier than 
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Figure 5 Non-normality (NN) of 95% one-day shortfall of style factors in two Barra factor models: Global Equity Model 2 (GEM2) and European Equity Model 3 (EUE3). The non-normality measure displayed is the percent difference between normal and Barra Extreme Risk estimates of 95% one-day shortfall. A positive value of NN means that the empirically observed ratio of shortfall to volatility exceeds the normal estimate. A negative ratio means that the normal estimate exceeds the empirically observed ratio.
normal. This result may be familiar to a veteran of financial markets, as it reflects empirical factor behavior across history.
Marginal contributions to shortfall admit to a simple and testable formulation. If the distribution of portfolio return is a smooth function of weights,
In other words, the marginal contribution to shortfall is equal to the expected return of asset i when the portfolio value at risk is exceeded. MCR s describes the behavior of assets when the portfolio suffers large losses, revealing which assets can be expected to mitigate a large loss.
Test statistics that evaluate the accuracy of shortfall are developed in Goldberg et al. (2008) , Watewai (2007) , and Barbieri et al. (2008) . These statistics compare forecast shortfall to realized loss (−P) when a value-at-risk limit is exceeded. They are averages of ratios (realized to forecast) or differences (realized minus forecast). Using Eq. (10), we can construct statistics to test marginal contributions of assets, sectors, and factors to shortfall. Further out-of-sample evaluation of shortfall and marginal contributions to shortfall for diverse classes of portfolios over different market climates and time horizons is required to assess the value of shortfall forecasts to investors.
The long view of history in BxR provides insight into extreme market dynamics, accounting for volatility uncertainty, sudden spikes in correlation, frequent outliers, and asymmetry between gains and losses. Out-of-sample results raise the possibility that financial extremes are, to some extent, predictable. Importantly, they are intrinsically less predictable than volatility. Nevertheless, the inclusion of shortfall in the portfolio construction process may lead to better performance, as shortfall addresses an aspect of risk and a source of data that are outside the purview of volatility.
Accurate shortfall forecasts and analysis advance our ability to manage financial risk, but this is only one aspect of a larger program. New sources of data will reveal new opportunities for empirical risk management, allowing refinements of old statistics or the estimation of new ones. Creative application of the theory of convex risk may lead to even more relevant and useful measures. On the theme of this special edition on the future of risk management, we provide a list of empirical questions for future research.
What is the impact of leverage on risk?
In the concluding remarks to his analysis of the LongTerm Capital Management (LTCM) investment strategies, Jorion (2000) Leverage scales the range of portfolio outcomes without changing the initial investment. The scale factor or leverage ratio (λ) in a portfolio is the amount invested divided by initial capital. In an influential article, Artzner et al. (1999) propose that risk depends linearly on leverage:
While there are theoretical benefits to linear scaling, such as the Euler decomposition of risk into sources (described in Goldberg et al. (2009) and elsewhere), it is not clear that Eq. (11) is flexible enough to measure the real impact of leverage on risk. Linear scaling implies that investing $100 of capital in a stock is only half as risky as borrowing an additional $100 to invest a total of $200 in the same stock. In the first investment, the most you can lose is your entire stake of $100. In the second, you stand to lose double your initial investment, and you are at the mercy of the market. It may be disadvantageous, or even impossible, to borrow what you owe.
Volatility and shortfall satisfy the linear scaling property in Eq. (11). Therefore, even in combination, they may not fully describe the risk of leverage in a portfolio. All convex risk measures satisfy a less restrictive leverage rule (as long as the risk of a constant-valued portfolio is zero): 
Is there a shortfall risk premium?
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) assumes that the price of an asset is determined by its covariance with the market and market volatility. According to Fama and French (2004) , most explanations for departure from the CAPM are of two types. The first is that equity indices and other proxies for the market portfolio used in empirical studies are not sufficiently representative. In other words, studies that purport to test the CAPM are, in fact, testing something else. The second type of explanation focuses on the simplifying assumptions underlying the CAPM, such as a consensus view of asset means and variances, market equilibrium, and absence of constraints (see, for example, Markowitz, 2005) . Fama and French point out that the empirical departure from the CAPM calls into question many of it textbook applications.
It is conceivable that markets demand a shortfall risk premium in certain climates. This raises the possibility that the market portfolio may sometimes be closer to mean-shortfall efficient than to meanvariance efficient. Or perhaps the market is efficient with respect to a convex risk measure that is sensitive to leverage. Tests described in Fama and French (2004) To be of any use, out of the money puts and other forms of downside protection must be purchased before a crisis occurs. However, incentive structures throughout the financial services industry tend to be aligned with short-term goals. The institution of less myopic incentives can be supported by empirical cost-benefit analysis of the value of downside protection. Since the results of any particular test depend on the details of the scenario used, it is desirable to consider the widest possible range of market conditions, asset classes, time horizons, investment strategies, and insurance types.
Taking the long view
Bender and Nielsen (2009) These common-sense principles are typical of the rhetoric that has accompanied the global market turmoil that began in 2007, but they are often ignored.
The empirically and scientifically motivated ideas reviewed in this paper have the potential to support new financial markets that work better than the old ones. But they are no substitute for judgment, prudence, or an incentive structure that takes the long view.
1 Time intervals begin on the first business day of the indicated month or year, and end on the last business day. 2 Artzner et al. (1999) were referring to the property of subadditivity, which is closely related to convexity. For example, a convex risk measure that scales linearly is subadditive; further details are in Föllmer and Schied (2004, Chapter 4) . The insight from Artzner et al. (1999) about diversification and subadditivity applies equally well when "subadditivity" is replaced with "convexity." 3 Change in portfolio value over an investment period can also be expressed in units of profit and loss. This is more general, since it allows for any starting value. However, units of return are generally preferred for long-only portfolios and those with relatively low leverage. 4 Even though the definition of convexity is expressed in terms of positive weights, convex measures are appropriate for measuring the risk of long-short portfolios. Further details are in Föllmer and Schied (2004, Chapter 4) . 5 Further details are in Menchero and Poduri (2008) . 6 The impacts of a single trade on different risk measures sometimes differ. Further details are in Goldberg et al. (2009 
